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Abstract
Jordan economy has experienced a noticeable decline 
in his currency in late 1980s. Whether this decline in 
Jordanian dinar exchange rate is likely to endure and 
what kind of policies need to be followed to ensure 
its stability, however, still continue to be questions 
of considerable policy relevance. This study aims at 
investigating the leading indicators associated with 
the start of currency crisis in Jordan between 1989 
and 1991. The paper employs two standard empirical 
methods of researching and forecasting a currency 
crisis: The signaling method and the Logit method to 
estimate the contribution of the key factors to currency 
crisis. The empirical results suggest that sharp decline 
in international reserves, decline in the trade balance, 
increase the broad money supply (M2), and finally the 
increase in the Dinar exchange rate raises the probability 
of currency crisis in Jordan. The finding also indicate 
that the four variables were identified as key to the 
warning system; they were succeeded and precisely 
warning system showed also a behavior and a precise 
description for the period preceding the currency crisis 
that occurred in Jordan. 
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INTRODUCTION
The basic idea of the early warning system (EWS) 
is to monitor key economic variables which would 
enable policymakers to predict a crisis, allowing them 
sufficient time to implement the appropriate measures to 
stem the crisis or at the very least minimize its adverse 
impact through a careful look at the behavior of specific 
economic variables. 
Since the break out of the various currency crises in 
1980s and 1990s, there have been several attempts devoted to 
the construction of an early warning system for predicting the 
probability of the next crisis in order to avoid its recurrence. 
The Jordan currency crises in 1989, the European currency 
crises in 1992, the Mexican peso crisis in 1994, the Asian 
currency crises in 1997-1998, and the Russian currency crisis 
in 1998 were indeed telling, as was the devastation resulting 
from the Argentine crisis in 2002. In order to prevent or at 
least to manage better such damage to the economy, finding 
an effective early warning system has become an important 
issue of the currency crises.
The outline of this study is as follows: Section 
two contains a brief review of currency crises and 
early warning system, section three discusses the 
econometric methodology, the definition of currency 
crisis, constructs the early warning system for currency 
crisis, definition of a crisis, definition of the term early" 
for currency crises, picks out a list of potential early 
warning indicators, finds the optimal threshold for each 
indicator, and finally identify the methods of prediction. 
Section four contains empirical results of currency crisis 
in Jordan, exchange market pressure index analysis, 
signal approach analysis, leading time of the leading 
indicators, and Logit model analysis. And finally section 
five presents the conclusions. 
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1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
The first formal model of a currency crisis presented 
by Krugman (1979), A Model of Balance-of-Payments 
Crises, provides the basic, intuitive insight into the first 
generation models of currency crises. Krugman claims 
that a currency crisis is caused by a large budget deficit 
that is financed by credit expansion. In their study 
Kaminsky et al. (1998), a currency crisis is defined to 
occur when a weighted average of monthly percentage 
nominal depreciations (either with respect to the US dollar 
or the Deutsche mark) and monthly percentage declines 
in reserves exceeds its mean by more than three standard 
deviations for that country. Frankel and Rose (1996), 
estimate the probability of crisis in an annual sample of 
105 developing countries covering 1971–92. A crisis is 
defined as a depreciation of at least 25%, exceeding the 
previous year’s depreciation by at least 10%. Berg and 
Pattillo (1998), they use a probit model to study currency 
crises. In their regression model, not only the crises 
themselves are labeled “one”, but also the 23 months prior 
to the crisis. They investigate whether a threshold value 
for the explanatory variables, as in the signals approach, 
improves on a linear specification. Mishkin (2000) 
examines the question “what are the financial policies 
which help make crises less likely in emerging market 
countries?” Also the study reviews the financial crises 
that struck Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 
1998 and Ecuador in 1999. The study came up with the 
following findings: a) There are four factors that lead to 
an increase in asymmetric information problems and thus 
to financial crisis: Deterioration of financial sector balance 
sheets; increase in interest rate; increases in uncertainty 
and deterioration of non-financial balance sheets to 
changes in asset prices; b) there are certain obvious links 
between a financial crisis and a currency crisis; the direct 
effect of currency devaluation on the balance sheet of 
firms; the devaluation of currency increases the debt 
burden of domestic firms, which was denominated in 
foreign currency as was the case of Mexico and Indonesia; 
c) devaluation of domestic currency leads to further 
deterioration in the balance sheets of the financial sector, 
provoking a large-scale banking crisis, as was the case in 
Mexico. Ivo Krznar (2004), Currency Crisis: Theory and 
Practice with Application to Croatia, the paper presents 
an early warning system of a currency crisis in Croatia, 
based on the signaling method and the probit model. The 
main findings that standing behind the currency cries are 
the real exchange rate appreciation that is below the trend, 
a decrease in the share of the balance of public finances 
in GDP, a decrease in the share of the current account 
balance of the balance of payments in GDP, an increase in 
inflation, and an increase in external debt, which increase 
the probability of a currency crisis. 
2.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA SET 
The sample period in this study span from the first quarter 
of 1984 up to the fourth quarter of 2008, according to 
Eichengreen et al. (1994, 1996), currency crisis can be 
measured through the EMP (Exchange Market Pressure) 
index, which is calculated as follow.
 tiusaitititi riieEMP ti ,,,, %)(%% , ∆−−∆+∆= ϕβα  (1)
where %Δei,t is the deflation rate of nominal exchange 
rate of country i at time t, %Δ(ii,t–iusaii,t ) is the difference 
of interest rate between country i and United State of 
America, %Δri,t is the change rate of foreign reserve, α, β, 
φ are the weights to make sure that the variances are equal 
among these three parts. Kaminsky et al (1998), Kaminsky 
(1998), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Goldstein 
et al. (2000) followed the concept of Eichengreen et al. 
(1994, 1996) fairly closely, but they excluded interest rate 
differentials in their index and comparisons to a reference 
country. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) modified this 
formula as follows. 
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Where Δ e/e is the rate of change of exchange rate, 
ΔR/R is the rate of change of foreign reserves, σe is the 
standard deviation of Δe/e, and σR is the standard deviation 
of ΔR/R. 
The reason for removing the interest rate is that some 
countries adopt interest rate control which forces this 
variable to have no significant explanatory role in the 
currency crisis.
The function of σe/σR is similar to the function of α, β, 
φ to make the variances of each part equal. Furthermore, 
the index was constructed separately for low and high 
inflation periods in order to avoid the problem that 
currency crises are associated with high inflation, where 
the latter is defined as the collection of months for which 
inflation in the previous 6 months was greater than 150%. 
However, a major drawback of this approach is that 
the weights, as well as the threshold value used to identify 
the speculative attack, are somewhat arbitrary. Kaminsky 
et al. (1998), for example, define crises as periods in 
which the Exchange Market Pressure index is at least 
three standard deviations above the mean, while in Edison 
(2000) a crisis is detected as soon as the index is above 
its mean by more than 2.5 standard deviations. To make a 
fair comparison, we will adopt the same classification as 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). The currency crises are 
defined as the situation when the observed EMP is greater 
than 3 standard deviations, otherwise no currency crisis 
is said to have happened. A currency crisis can then be 
defined as follows.
Crisis i,t = 1 if EMP i,t > 3σEMPi + μ EMPi 
= 0 otherwise    (3)
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Where μ EMPi and σEMPi are going to be calculated 
based on the in-sample data, and used to define the crisis 
for both the in-sample and out-of-sample data.
As mentioned earlier in this paper, the basic idea of the 
EWS is monitor the evolution of a number of economic 
variables. When one of these variables deviates from its 
“normal” level beyond a certain “threshold” value, this is 
taken as a warning signal about a possible currency crisis 
within a specific period of time. This specific period of 
time is called “early”.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) define the term early 
for currency crisis as between one month and twenty-four 
months before the beginning of the crisis. Thus, a signal 
that is followed by a crisis within that interval of time 
is called a good early warning signal, while a signal not 
followed by a crisis within that interval of time is called a 
false early warning signal, or noise. 
A commonly used approach involves comparing the 
behavior of a set of macroeconomic variables before a 
crisis with that during tranquil times. One of the possible 
variations of this methodology is to monitor the stylized 
facts in the period preceding the currency crisis. The pre-
crisis behavior of a variable is compared to its behavior 
during non-crisis periods for the same group of countries 
or for the group of countries where no crisis occurred. 
The aim is to find variables that display anomalous 
performance before a crisis but do not provide false 
signals predicting crisis, which will never happen (see 
WEO, 1998, p. 126; Tomczyٌska, 2000). 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) presented 
a very detailed overview of such indicators. Any signal 
identified within the 24-months window before the crisis 
was considered as a good one, while any signal outside that 
period was regarded as a false alarm. The leading indicators 
were grouped into the following broad categories: Domestic 
macroeconomic variables; (2) External sector variables; (3) 
Public finance; (4) Global variables; (5) Institutional and 
structural variables. After the additional selection based 
on other empirical studies, authors came to conclusions 
summarized in Table 1. It shows the number of studies, in 
which any particular indicator was considered and results 
were statistically significant. 
Table 1 
Early Warnings Indicator (Statistically Significant)
Sector Variable Number of studies considered Statistically significant results
 Monetary Policy
International reserves
M2/int. Reserves
real exchange rate
inflation
money
money multiplier
credit growth
central bank credit to banks
real interest rates
12
3
14
5
3
1
7
1
1
11
3
12
5
2
1
5
1
1
Fiscal Policy
fiscal deficit
government consumption
credit to public sector
5
1
3
3
1
3
Real Sector real GDP growth or levelemployment/unemployment
9
3
5
2
External Sector
trade balance
exports
terms of trade
3
3
3
2
2
2
Global Variables
Foreign interest rates
Domestic-foreign interest rate differential
foreign real GDP growth
4
2
2
2
1
1
Institutional and
Structural
banking crisis
financial liberalization
openness
crisis elsewhere
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
Source: Tomczyٌska (2000) following analyzes of Kaminsky, Lizondo, Reinhart (1998).
The above results were partly confirmed by the cross-
country empirical analyzes carried out by the members 
of the CASE research team. Sasin (2001a) examined the 
panel of 46 developed and developing countries for the 
period of 1990s. The special attention was devoted to 
distinction between variables emphasized by the first-
generation and second-generation models, including 
multiple equilibria and contagion effect. Considerable 
amount of predictability was found in respect to such 
«classical» indicators as overvaluation of a real exchange 
rate and the level of central bank’s international reserves. 
Multiple equilibria did not get much support from the 
investigated data while contagion, through various 
channels, was clearly present. 
16Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Developing an Early Warning System for Currency 
Crises: The Case of Jordan 1984-2008
Find an optimal threshold for each indicator that, once 
reached, is going to give us an accurate signal of a future 
crisis. In other words, that threshold cuts tranquil periods 
from crisis periods. So an indicator is said to issue a 
signal whenever it departs from its mean beyond a given 
threshold value, usually the threshold value can be located 
between the tenth percentile and the twentieth percentile 
(Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998) or between the 
first percentile and the twentieth percentile (Goldstein, 
Kaminsky, & Reinhart, 2000). In this paper we will adopt 
the former method. 
2.1  Signal Approach
The basic idea of this approach is that the economy 
behaves differently on the eve of currency crises as 
compared with a more relatively ‘normal’ period. 
Furthermore, this aberrant behavior seems to have a 
recurrent systemic pattern. For example, currency crises 
are usually preceded by an overvaluation of the currency; 
banking crises tend to follow sharp declines in asset 
prices. Let A and B represent respectively the number of 
times we observe a signal when there is really a crisis and 
no crisis in 24 months. Let C and D represent respectively 
the number of times without signaling when there is really 
a crisis about to happen and no crisis during 24 months. 
A and D are the correct predictions, but B and C are the 
wrong predictions. We call B the false alarm. Let ω = 
[B/ (B+D)]/ [A/ (A+C)], where B/ (B+D) represents the 
wrong prediction rate when there is no crisis, and A/ (A+C) 
represents the correct prediction rate when there is a crisis. 
ω is called noise-to-signal ratio. The signal approach is 
given diagnostic and predictive content by specifying 
what is meant by an “early warning, by defining an 
“optimal threshold” for each indicator, and is decided by 
minimizing the ratio ω. Usually the threshold value can 
be located between the tenth percentile and the twentieth 
percentile (Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998) or 
between the first percentile and the twentieth percentile 
(Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart, 2000). In this paper 
we will adopt the former method. 
Table 2
Contingency Table of the Crisis
Crisis No crisis
Signaling A B
No signal C D
Source: Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998.
2.2  Logistic Approach
Since the dependent variable, currency crisis, is a binary 
variable from a qualitative point of view, the logistic 
regression model is also seemingly a good candidate 
(Baltagi, 1995). Let Yit=1 represent that country i has a 
crisis at time t, and Yit=0 otherwise. Let Pit indicate the 
probability of country i to have a crisis at time t, then
E (Yit)=1×Pit+ 0(1–Pit) =Pit (4)
which can be expanded by including n explanatory 
variables and can be written as the following equation.
Pit= Pr (Yit=1) = E (Yit| X) = F' (β' Xit) (5)
Y*it = β' Xit +εit (6)
where Y *it is the actual dependent variable which 
cannot be observed, and Xit is the vector consisting of 
n explanatory variables, β′ is the vector consisting of n 
unknown coefficients, εit is the error term. Then the log-
likelihood function can be written as follows.
 ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }∑∑
= =
′−−+′
T
t
I
i
itititit XFPXFPL
1 1
1ln1lnlog ββ   (7)
Where T is the number of periods, the parameters can 
be obtained through the maximum likelihood method 
(Gujarati, 2003).
3.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical part of this paper can be divided into three 
parts; the first one exhibits the results of the early warning 
system developed in this paper to predict the currency 
crisis in Jordan using the Exchange Market Pressure index 
(EMP), The second part shows the results of the leading 
indicators of a currency crisis in Jordan by employing the 
signal approach, and the third part seeks to explore the 
relation between the leading indicators and the currency 
crisis in Jordan and to indicate the contributions of the 
these indicators in triggering a currency crisis in future 
by running the logit model against the dependent variable 
which is the currency crisis expressed as “crisis” in the 
following analysis. 
3.1  Exchange Market Pressure Index Analysis
Based on what we have already explained in section three 
we calculated the EMP according to equation (2) over 
the whole period of the study. Then we used the results 
of this equation to predict the currency crisis in Jordan 
according to equation (3), then we applied the calculations 
for the in-sample period of the study which extended from 
1984Q2-2008Q4, the findings confirmed that Jordan had 
two currency crises in this period, one was in December 
1988, and the other one in March 1989, which is agreed 
with what Jordan have in the reality, see Table 3. In 
order to assess the predicting power of the early warning 
system developed in this study, we simulated the crisis 
that Jordan had in 1988-89; by proposing a shock of the 
same declined ratios in an out-of-sample extended from 
2007Q1-2008Q, for both of the nominal exchange.
GREX: Growth rate of nominal exchange rate. RES: 
Gross international reserves. GRES: Growth rate of gross 
international reserves, EMP: exchange market pressure, μ 
+ 3σ: Threshold rate of JD, and to the gross international 
reserves. As shown in Table 3, the results did confirm 
that the predicting power of the early warning system for 
the out-of-sample period2007:Q1-2008Q3, as shown for 
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the in-sample period 1984:Q1-2006Q4. And exhibited 
that if the nominal exchange rate of JD, and the gross 
international reserves declined by the same ratios that 
happened in 1988 (column 2, and column 4 of Table 
3) respectively, then the early warning system signaled 
that we will have two currency crises, the first one in 
September 2007, and the second in march 2008, which is 
consistent with the spirit of an “early warning system”, 
and fulfill the first and the second hypotheses which 
implied that the early warning system can predict the 
currency crisis in-sample and out-of-sample as well.
Table 3
The Growth Rate of Nominal Exchange Rate of JD/$US and the Gross Internal Reserves During 1988-1989
Quarter Nominal exchange rate JD/$US (e.o.p) (1) GNEX (2) RES (3) GRES (4) EMP (5) μ + 3σ (6) Crisis (7)
1988 Q1 - - - - - - -
1988 Q2 .335 0.089 287.462 -0.045 0.094 0.141 0
1988 Q3 .365 0.037 274.504 0.158 0.018 0.141 0
1988 Q4 .378 0.260 318.137 -0.021 0.263 0.141 1
1989 Q1 .477 0.132 311.215 -0.651 0.213 0.141 1
1989 Q2 .54 0.052 108.361 0.397 0.003 0.141 0
1989 Q3 .568 0.082 151.445 1.36 -0.086 0.141 0
1989 Q4 .615 0.053 357.495 -0.071 0.062 0.141 0
Source: Authors calculations. 
Table 4 
The Nominal Exchange Rate of JD/$US and the Gross Internal Reserves During Out-of-Sample (2007-2008) Shock 
Quarter NEXR JD/$US SNEXR GSNEX RES SRES GSRE GRES SEMP Sμ + S3σ SCRISIS
2007 Q1 .709 .646 0.057 4536.3 3815.245 0.191 -0.019 0.040 0.21879 0
2007 Q2 .709 .682 -0.232 4446.4 4543.144 0.737 0.074 -0.294 0.21879 0
2007 Q3 .709 .524 0.174 4778.4 7893.024 -0.628 0.019 0.228 0.21879 1
2007 Q4 .709 .615 0.092 4871.4 2934.546 -1.472 -0.21 0.217 0.21879 0
2008 Q1 .709 .672 -0.032 3844.5 -1386.17 -4.612 0.215 0.360 0.21879 1
2008 Q2 .709 .651 0.031 4674.3 5006.736 0.338 0.168 0.003 0.21879 0
2008 Q3 .709 .671 0.019 5462.6 6698.565 -0.425 0.005 0.055 0.21879 0
Source: Authors calculations.
SNEXR: Shocked Nominal Exchange Rate JD/$US, 
GSREX: Growth rate of shocked nominal exchange rate 
SRES: shocked gross international reserves. GSRES: 
Growth rate of shocked gross international reserves, EMP: 
Shocked exchange market pressure, sμ + s3σ: Shocked 
threshold, SCRISIS: the shocked crisis.
3.2  Signal Approach Analysis
After having known that the EMP was able to predict 
the currency crisis, we employed this result in the signal 
approach to check if it is able as well to determine the 
leading indicators of a currency crisis that give signals 
during the signalling window before the onset of a crisis 
or not. The effectiveness of the signals approach can 
be examined at the level of individual indicators and 
at the level of set of indicators. The discussion below 
examines the effectiveness of individual indicators. It 
applies the analysis presented in section 3, by ranking the 
various indicators according to their forecasting ability, 
and by examining the lead time. In order to examine the 
effectiveness of individual indicators, it would be useful 
to consider the performance of each indicator in terms of 
the following matrix:
Crisis No crisis
(Within 24 months) (Within 24 months)
Signal was issued A B
No signal was issued C D
In this matrix, A is the number of months in which the 
indicator issued a good signal, B is the number of months 
in which the indicator issued bad signal or “noise”, C is 
the number of months in which the indicator failed to 
issue a signal (which would have been a good signal), 
and D is the number of months in which the indicator 
refrained from issuing a signal (which would have been 
a bad signal). A perfect indicator would only produce 
observations that belong to north-west and south-east 
cells of this matrix (A, D). It would issue a signal in 
every month that is to be followed by a crisis (within the 
next 24 months), so that A > 0 and C = 0, and it would 
refrain from issuing a signal in every month that is not 
to be followed by a crisis (within the next 24 months), 
so that B=0 and D > 0, of course, in practice, none of the 
indicators fit the profile of a perfect indicator. However, 
the matrix above will be useful reference to assess how 
close or how far is each indicator from that profile. 
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Information on performance of individual indicators is 
presented in Table 5. For each indicator, the first column 
shows the percentage of crises correctly called, defined as the 
number of crises for which the indicator issued at least one 
signal in previous 24 months (expressed as a percentage of 
the total number of crises for which data on the indicator are 
available). Virtually every indicator called correctly at least 
half of the crises in their respective samples. On average, the 
various indicators called correctly 70 percent of crises.
The second column of Table 5 shows an alternative 
measure of the tendency of individual indicators to issue 
good signals. It shows that the number of good signals 
issued by the indicator, expressed as a percentage of the 
number of months in which good signals could have been 
issued (A/(A+C) in terms of the above matrix). While 
obtaining 100 percent in the second column of Table 5 
would require that at least one signal be issued within 24 
months prior to each crisis, a 100 percent in the second 
column would require that a signal be issued every month 
during the 24 months prior to each crisis. In terms of the 
results in the second column, the Political Stability is the 
indicator that issued the highest percentage of possible 
good signals (25 percent), while real GDP issued the 
lowest percentage of possible good signals (2 percent) 
sending bad signals. It shows the number of bad signals 
issued by the indicator, expressed as a percentage of the 
number of the months in which bad signals could have 
been issued (B/ (B+D) in terms of the above matrix). 
Other things equal, the lower the number in this column 
is, the better the indicator. The Political Stability, once 
again, shows the best performance (issuing 6 percent of 
possible bad signals), while the Current Account Balance 
shows the poorest performance (issuing 81 percent 
of possible bad signals). The information about the 
indicators’ ability to issue good signals and to avoid bad 
signals can be combined into a measure of the “noisiness” 
of the indicators. The fourth column of Table 5 shows 
the “adjusted “noise-to-signal ratio; this is obtained by 
dividing false signals measured as a proportion of months 
in which false signals could have been issued, by good 
signals measured as a proportion of months in which 
signals could have been issued ([B/ (B+D)]/ [A/ (A+C)] in 
terms of the a above matrix). Other things equal, the lower 
the number in this column, the better the indicator. 
The various indicators differ significantly with respect 
to their adjusted NTS ratios. While this ratio is only 0.06 
for the Political Stability (followed by fiscal deficit at 
.33), it is 1.3 for the Real GDP. The adjusted NTS ratio 
can be used as a criterion for deciding which indicators 
to drop from the list of possible indicators. A signaling 
device that issues signals at random times (and thus 
has no intrinsic predictive power) would obtain (with a 
sufficiently large sample) an adjusted NTS ratio equal to 
unity. Therefore, those indicators with an adjusted NTS 
ratio equal to or higher than unity introduce excessive 
noise, and so are not helpful in predicting crises. Thus, on 
the basis of the results presented in Table 5, there is one 
indicator that should be removed from the list of those to 
be used within the signal approach, which is the real GDP 
indicator. These findings agreed with that of kaminsky 
et.al especially for some of the common leading indicators 
used in both studies, such as the ratio of broad money 
supply (M2) to international reserves, in their study the 
ratio was 0.42 while in ours was 0.42, and for exports was 
0.45 in our paper, whereas, it was 0.42 in their paper, see 
Table 5 for the rest of indicators.
Table 5 
Performance of Indicators Under the Signal Approach
Percentage of crises 
called (1)
Good signals as percentage 
of possible good signals (2) 
Bad signals as percentage 
of possible bad signals (3)
Noise/signal 
(adjusted) (4) 
In terms of the matrix in the text A/(A+C) B/(B+D) [B/(B+D)/ A/(A+C)]
Political Stability 25 100 6 0.06
Fiscal Deficit 9 33 11 0.33
Inflation 14 100 36 0.36
Money supply (M2) 10 75 32 0.42
Exports 21 77 35 0.45
Employment 14 66 30 0.45
Openness 18 100 48 0.48
Terms of Trade 20 75 39 0.52
Trade Balance 10 80 43 0.53
Domestic credit 9 60 36 0.60
Real Exchange Rate 10 100 65 0.65
Real Effective Exchange Rate 13 50 36 0.72
Current Account Balance 10 100 81 0.81
M2/International Reserves 7 66 58 0.87
International reserves 9 66 60 0.90
Real GDP 2 33 43 1.3
Source: Authors calculations.
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Column (1): Shows the percentage of crises correctly 
called, defined as the number of crises for which the indicator 
issued at least one signal in previous 24 months. Column 
(2): Shows that the number of good signals issued by the 
indicator, expressed as a percentage of the number of months 
in which good signals could have been issued Column (3): 
Shows the number of bad signals issued by the indicator, 
expressed as a percentage of the number of the months 
in which bad signals could have been issued Column (4): 
Shows the noise to signal ratio Columon3/column 2
4  LEADING TIME OF THE LEADING 
INDICATORS
The previous discussion has ranked the indicators 
according to their ability to predict crises while producing 
few false alarms. However, such criteria are silent as 
to the lead time of the signal. From the vantage point 
of a policymaker who wants to implement preemptive 
measures, he/she will not be indifferent between an 
indicator that sends signals well before the crisis occurs 
and one that signals only when the crisis is imminent. In 
focusing on the 24-month window prior to the onset of 
the crisis, the criteria for ranking The indicators presented 
in Table 5 do not distinguish between a signal given 12 
months prior to the crisis and one given one month prior 
to the crisis. 
To examine this issue, we tabulated for each of the 
indicators considered the average number of months in 
advance of the crisis when the first signal occurs; this, 
of course, does not preclude the fact that the indicator 
may continue to give signals through the entire period 
immediately preceding the crisis. Table 6 presents the 
results. Indeed, the most striking fact about these results 
is that, on average, all the indicators send the first signal 
anywhere between half a year and two years before the 
crisis erupts, with openness and terms of trade sector 
(which reflects the external sector indicator) offering the 
longest lead time. Hence, on this basis, all the indicators 
considered are leading rather than coincident except the 
fiscal deficit and real GDP, which is consistent with the 
spirit of an early warning system.
Table 6 
Average Lead Time
Indicator Number of months in advance of the crisis when first signal occur
Openness 24
Terms of Trade 24
Exports 21
Current Account Balance 21
Real Exchange Rate 18
M2/International Reserves 18
Money supply (M2) 18
Real interest rate 15
Inflation 12
Employment 12
Trade Balance 12
International reserves 12
Real Effective Exchange Rate 9
Domestic credit 9
Political Stability 6
Fiscal Deficit -
Real GDP -
Source: Authors calculations.
The findings above relatively closed again to some other 
studies like that of kaminsky et.al especially for some of the 
common leading indicators used in both studies. 
5.  LOGIT MODEL ANALYSIS
Exploring the relationship between currency crisis and 
potential variables that may trigger currency crisis in 
Jordan require estimating logit model as mentioned in 
subsection 3-6-2 of section three. But, before moving to 
this step, let us have a look at the characteristics of the 
data used in running the model, Table 7 below shown the 
summary statistics.
Table 7 
Summary Statistics
GOREX CRISIS GRES GOFD GORGDP GOTB GOPENES
Mean 0.003939 0.373737 0.061717 1.217475 0.011111 0.045455 0.003293
Median 0.000000 0.000000 0.020000 -0.880000 0.010000 0.030000 0.004000
Maximum 0.160000 1.000000 1.360000 135.7200 0.120000 0.870000 0.216000
Minimum -0.080000 0.000000 -0.650000 -34.10000 -0.120000 -0.500000 -0.190000
Std. Dev. 0.032758 0.486257 0.260161 16.06384 0.056168 0.241286 0.073132
Skewness 0.905640 0.521967 1.874499 6.362295 -0.101385 0.438638 0.432461
Kurtosis 7.943182 1.272450 11.53005 52.35749 2.457945 3.754409 3.417963
Jarque-Bera 114.3276 16.80619 358.1189 10717.07 1.381622 5.522328 3.806483
Probability 0.000000 0.000224 0.000000 0.000000 0.501170 0.063218 0.149085
ADF -5.999345* -6.70110* -507487*1 -6.043321* -12.56432* -8.909689* -9.253695*
Sum 0.390000 37.00000 6.110000 120.5300 1.100000 4.500000 0.326000
Sum Sq. Dev. 0.105164 23.17172 6.633008 25288.61 0.309178 5.705455 0.524133
Observations 99 99 99 99 99 99 99
Source: Authors calculations.
NOTES: * is significant at 1% levels.
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In order to have large sample for the estimation of a 
currency crisis in Jordan, the paper is based on a quarterly 
data over the period 1984:01–2008:3. The statistics in the 
Table 8 shows based on Jarque-Bera that we can reject 
the null hypothesis of normal distribution. Kurtosis shows 
that the probability density function (PDF) for growth rate 
of openness (GOPENES), growth rate of trade balance 
(GOTB), growth rate of fiscal deficit (GOFD), the growth 
rate of gross international reserves GRES), and the growth 
rate of real exchange rate (GOREX) is greater than three 
which mean it is leptokurtic (slim or long tailed). Also, 
the skewness shows the PDF lacks of symmetry and it has 
a long right tail [The normal distribution has the following 
features skewness = 0, Kurtosis = 3, Jarque-Bera = 0.]. 
The estimation of Logit model, equation (7) produces 
statistically significant and economically intuitive results. 
Table 8 reveals the results of predicting currency crisis by 
using the Logit model.
The results demonstrate that: The relation between 
the probability of a currency crisis and the growth rate of 
gross international reserve (GRES) in Jordan is negative 
and statistically highly significant, the relation between 
the probability of a currency crisis and the growth rate of 
real exchange rate (GOREX) in Jordan is positive. That is, 
increasing the growth rate of real exchange rate (GOREX), 
will lead to an increasing in the probability of a currency 
crisis in Jordan, the relation between growth rate of trade 
balance (GOTB) and the currency crisis is also negative, 
i.e. an increase in the growth rate of trade balance will 
decrease the probability of currency crisis, while the 
opposite will increase the probability. The relationship 
of the broad money supply (GOM2) with probability of 
currency crisis is strongly positive, i.e., if the growth rate 
of M2 increased the probability of currency crisis will 
increase, while if it decreased the probability of crisis will 
increased as well.
To predict the probability of currency crisis, that 
logistic regression has been performed on gross 
international reserve, real exchange rate, trade balance, 
and broad money supply (M2); the estimates obtained 
from the logistic regression analysis are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Summary of Logit Regression Analysis
Leading indicators Coefficient Std. error Prob.
C -0.992363 0.481385 0.1743
(GRES) -23.41807 5.261939 0.0393
(GOREX) 29.93375 13.41899 0.0000
(GOTB) -3.851982 1.885555 0.0257
(GOM2) 38.87957 16.87712 0.0411
Source: Authors calculations.
So the estimate of c is -0.9923, of gross international 
reserves is -23.4, of real exchange rate is 29.9, of trade 
balance is -3.8, and of broad money supply (M2) is 38.8, 
the odds of currency crisis are less if the Jordan economy 
has a high gross international reserves, high trade balance, 
low money supply, and low exchange rate.
The equation of the Ln (odds), or logit, is estimated 
by:
Ln (odds) = -0.9923- 0.23(GRES) + 0.29(GOREX) – 
0.03(GOTB) + 0.38(GOM2)
The interpretation of these coefficients is as mentioned 
above. Where the dependent variable (currency crisis) is: 
Ln (PZ/1-PZ) and PZ is the logistic regression equation, 
estimated as:
 
0.38(GOM2 + 0.03(GOTB) - )0.29(GOREX + 0.23(GRES) -{-0.9923 exp +1
38(GOM2) 0.+ 0.03(GOTB) - )0.29(GOREX + 0.23(GRES) -{-0.9923 exp crisis)(currency  Prob =
 
0.38(GOM2 + 0.03(GOTB) - )0.29(GOREX + 0.23(GRES) -{-0.9923 exp +1
38(GOM2) 0.+ 0.03(GOTB) - )0.29(GOREX + 0.23(GRES) -{-0.9923 exp crisis)(currency  Prob =
For the continuous variables as we have here in 
this paper, with slope coefficients, the quantity exp (b) 
is interpreted as the ratio of the odds for the Jordan 
economy with value X+1 relative to the odds for the 
Jordan economy with value X. Therefore, exp (b) is the 
incremental odds ratio corresponding to an increase of one 
percent in the variables in our paper, assuming that the 
values of all others X variables remain unchanged. 
The probabil i ty  of  currency cr is is  in  Jordan 
according to the above illustration is shown in Table 9, 
the probability increased or decreased according to the 
relation between the currency crisis and the variable 
included. 
Table 9 
The Estimates of the Probability of Currency Crisis
Leading indicators Prob (currency crisis)
(GRES) 0.226829668
(GOREX) 0.333374264
(GOTB) 0.262925161
(GOM2) 0.353542444
Source: Authors calculations.
CONCLUSION
Based on what we have already explained in this paper, 
the first finding confirmed that Jordan had two currency 
crises, one was in December 1988, and the other in 
March 1989, which is agreed with what Jordan have in 
the reality. If the nominal exchange rate of JD, and the 
gross international reserves declined by the same ratios 
that happened in 1988-1989, then the early warning 
system would signal two currency crises, the first one in 
September 2007, and the second in march 2008, which is 
consistent with the spirit of an early warning system. 
Using a signals approach, the set of leading indicators 
proved to be useful in predicting previous episodes of 
currency crisis in Jordan. Every indicator called correctly 
at least half of the crises in their respective samples. 
On average, the various indicators called correctly 70 
percent of crises. The Political Stability is the indicator 
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that issued the highest percentage of possible good 
signals (25 percent), while real GDP issued the lowest 
percentage of possible good signals (2 percent). Measures 
the performance of individual indicator regarding 
sending bad signals, the lower the number is, the better 
the indicator. The Political Stability, once again, shows 
the best performance (issuing 6 percent of possible bad 
signals), while the Current Account Balance shows the 
poorest performance (issuing 81 percent of possible bad 
signals). The most striking fact about leading time of the 
leading indicator, was on average, all indicators send the 
first signal anywhere between half a year and two years 
before the crisis erupts, with openness and terms of trade 
( which reflect the external sector indicators) offering the 
longest lead time. Hence, on this basis, all the indicators 
considered are leading rather than coincident except the 
fiscal deficit and real GDP, which is consistent with the 
spirit of an early warning system. The relation between 
the probability of a currency crisis and the growth rate 
of gross international reserve in Jordan is negative and 
statistically highly significant, the relation between the 
probability of a currency crisis and the growth rate of real 
exchange rate in Jordan is positive. That is, increasing 
the growth rate of real exchange rate, will lead to an 
increasing in the probability of a currency crisis in Jordan, 
the relation between growth rate of trade balance and the 
currency crisis is also negative, i.e., an increase in the 
growth rate of trade balance will decrease the probability 
of currency crisis, while the opposite will increase the 
probability, and the relation of the broad money supply 
with probability of currency crisis is strongly positive, 
i.e., if the growth rate of M2 increased the probability 
of currency crisis will increase, while if it decreased the 
probability of crisis will increased as well.
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